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Abstract.  Spatial equilibrium models rely on migration to arbitrage away differences in utility 
across locations net of moving costs, where remaining differences in wages and rents reflect the 
compensating differentials related to site-specific amenities.  Recent refinements to the spatial 
equilibrium model focus upon the prospect of disequilibrium in amenity markets.  Amenity 
market disequilibrium implies over- or under-compensation (incomplete compensation) across 
some locations, which suggests a role for these factors in subsequent migration.  This paper fol-
lows the theoretical and empirical approach of Clark, Herrin, Knapp, and White (2003).  An 
intercity wage regression is estimated where fixed effects capture the impact of site characteris-
tics on wages.  We then regress the fixed effects on a comprehensive vector of site attributes, 
where the residuals capture incomplete compensation in wages.  The derived measures of in-
complete compensation are included in a binary logit model of migration. The results provide 
further evidence that incomplete compensation for site characteristics is a significant factor in 
migration decisions, and the findings are consistent with tendencies toward spatial equilib-
rium. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Following the debates of the late 1970s and 1980s 
regarding the determinants of household migration, 
researchers now recognize the dual roles of disequilib-
rium factors in labor markets and equilibrium factors 
driven by changes in demand for site-specific attrib-
utes.  Clark et al. (2003) developed a model that in-
cluded factors that capture disequilibrium in amenity 
markets along with conventional equilibrium factors.  
Clark et al. estimated a three stage empirical model 
using the 1990 Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS), 
where derived measures of city-specific incomplete 
compensation were included as determinants of mi-
gration.   In the first stage, an intercity wage regression 
is regressed on demographic and human capital 
measures in addition to a control for the median house 
value and metropolitan area fixed effects [see Gabriel 
and Rosenthal (1999)].  The fixed effects capture the 
net impact of a location’s site characteristics on wages.  
The fixed effects are regressed on a comprehensive 
vector of site attributes in the second stage.  With ade-
quate controls for the salient site characteristics, the 
residuals from the intercity wage regression can then 
be interpreted as measures of over- and under-
compensation in wages.  Finally, the measures of in-
complete compensation are included in a discrete 
choice model of migration.   
Clark et al. (2003) found that measures of over-
compensation and under-compensation at both the 
origin and destination locations had the anticipated 
impacts on migration.  Specifically, over-compensation 
at the origin, and under-compensation at the destina-
tion, ceteris paribus, decreased the likelihood of a move, 
while the opposite was found for under-compensation 
at the origin and over-compensation at the destination.  
A comparison of the marginal probabilities suggested 
that incomplete compensation measures were more 
important at the destination than the origin and that 
households were generally more responsive to under-
compensation than over-compensation.   
Special Section on Migration - JRAP 36(2): 140-152.  © 2006 MCRSA.  All Rights Reserved                             
Incomplete Compensation and Migration                                                                                                                     141 
  
These findings provide the impetus for the present 
paper.  Here we set out to determine whether results 
similar to Clark et al. (2003) can be obtained by apply-
ing the same empirical model to data from the recently 
released 2000 PUMS.  Similar findings from the 2000 
data would provide additional support for the hy-
pothesis that incomplete amenity compensation is a 
significant factor in household migration decisions.1   
The paper is organized as follows.  A description of 
the related literature is presented in Section 2.  The 
third section describes the empirical model.  Empirical 
findings are reported in Section 4 and the final section 
of the paper contains concluding remarks.    
 
2. Relevant Literature 
 
 Equilibrium approaches to migration tend to em-
phasize locational attributes while disequilibrium 
models focus on economic opportunity variables.  Re-
search by some scholars (Greenwood, 1985; Green-
wood and Hunt, 1989; Evans, 1990) found that dis-
equilibrium factors were important determinants of 
migration, whereas other studies (Graves, 1979; 
Graves and Linneman, 1979; Knapp and Graves, 1982; 
Clark and Hunter, 1992; Mueser and Graves, 1995) 
demonstrate that site-characteristics play an important 
role.  As Hunt (1993) suggests in his survey of migra-
tion models, disequilibrium in amenity markets had 
not yet been considered as a determinant of migration.  
Following Herzog and Schlottmann (1993), it became 
clear that amenity induced migration and amenity 
valuation were inextricably linked. 
 Since the work of Rosen (1979), which was refined 
by Roback (1982), and Blomquist, Berger and Hoehn 
(1988), it has been recognized that spatial variation in 
amenities are capitalized into local wages and land 
rents.  While not the focus of these studies, migration 
is the mechanism by which amenity capitalization is 
revealed in local factor prices.  Research explicitly 
aimed at examining the role of amenities as determi-
nants of household migration followed (Berger and 
Blomquist (1992), Graves (1979), and Graves and Lin-
neman (1979)).  The studies following Rosen were 
grounded in the equilibrium approach to migration, 
where, in equilibrium, utility is spatially invariant and 
there is no incentive to migrate.  However, Graves 
(1979) and Graves and Linneman (1979) found that 
shifts in amenity demands such as changes in income 
or life-cycle induced changes in preferences create in-
centives for migration.  Therefore, two sources of 
                                                 
1 In contrast to migration studies using microdata, Clark (2006) 
found that net migration rates were not significantly influenced by 
the incomplete compensation measures derived in Clark et al. 
(2003).  
amenity driven migration are evident from previous 
research.  One is derived from the equilibrium ap-
proach, where changes in amenity demands influence 
migration.  The second source of amenity driven mi-
gration results from disequilibrium in amenity mar-
kets, which includes the over-compensation or under-
compensation for site attributes in local wages and 
land rents.  Both sources of amenity driven migration 
are analyzed in Clark, et al. (2003) and in this paper.   
 
3.  Model 
 
 The theoretical foundation for the empirical model 
is derived from Henderson (1982) who showed an 
equilibrium tradeoff between the city wage and amen-
ity bundle which he defines as a wage-opportunity 
locus (WOL).  As is seen in Figure 1, the WOL is an equi-
librium reduced-form model that is mapped by the 
tangencies of household wage-acceptance functions 
(WA1-WA3) and firm offer functions (FO1-F03).  The 
wage-acceptance function is an iso-utility curve for 
consumers and the various curves WA1-WA3 represent 
different individuals with different tastes.  Likewise, 
the firm-offer curve is an iso-profit curve, and FO1-F03 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Wage-Amenity Tradeoff 
 
 
represent different competitive firms that are breaking 
even.  In equilibrium, households and firms sort them-
selves along the WOL such that no further re-
allocations can generate utility or profit enhancing 
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moves2.  However, if a particular city offers a wage-
amenity bundle that is above or below the WOL (e.g., 
WA4 at amenity level A1), then that city is offering a 
wage that is higher than is necessary (i.e., W4>W2) to 
compensate for the city’s amenity bundle.  We define 
W4>W2 as over-compensation, which is assumed to 
generate in-migration.  If the city is small relative to 
the national labor market, it is expected that in-
migration would ultimately return the city to the equi-
librium wage (W2).   
 A sample of 142,138 households residing in 78 
MSAs was drawn from the 2000 PUMS database3.  The 
three stage process outlined in Clark et al. (2003) was 
applied to this sample.  It is summarized as follows: 
 
Stage 1:  Deriving metropolitan fixed effects 
 
Ordinary least squares was used to estimate the fol-
lowing hedonic wage equation of stage one.  The 
equation to be estimated is: 
 
ln (annual wage income) = Xiβ + ajδj + eij  (1)
  
 The vector X represents personal characteristics, 
and fixed effects dummy variables are expressed by δj, 
where the parameter aj is a measure of the average ef-
fect on wage income, ceteris paribus, of residing in a 
given MSA. Equation (1) is estimated without an inter-
cept term; therefore, the fixed effects represent unique 
                                                 
2 While Roback (1980) shows that interregional amenity differences 
are capitalized into both wages and land rents, Henderson (1982) 
notes that as long as the average land value is controlled in the 
equation, that this is akin to the individual who locates at the edge 
of the city, and hence all capitalization is reflected in wage differen-
tials.   
3 The IPUMS interface was used to extract the 2000 PUMS 1% sam-
ple.  A much smaller sample of metropolitan areas were identified 
in the 2000 PUMS sample than in the 1990 PUMS sample.  This is 
because of a change in the manner in which spatial areas were de-
fined.  In the 1990 PUMS, the so-called PUMAs (Public Use Micro-
data Areas) were constructed by the Census to coincide with metro-
politan boundaries.  Hence, the 1990 PUMS identified all metropoli-
tan areas with population of at least 100,000 persons (i.e. the mini-
mum PUMA size).  In contrast, the 2000 Census focused on Super-
PUMAs with populations of at least 400,000.  Thus, the minimum 
size for metropolitan areas that are identified in the 2000 PUMS was 
400,000.  Furthermore, states that defined their own Super-PUMAs 
were not required to have the boundaries of those areas coincide 
with the boundaries of metropolitan areas.   Overall, this dramati-
cally reduced the number of metropolitan areas that were reported 
by the Census.  After adjusting the sample for missing data, we 
were left with 78 metropolitan areas as compared to 267 in 1990.  
While the spatial distribution of metropolitan areas across the four 
Census Regions was similar between 1990 and 2000, the size distri-
bution was not.  The average population of the metropolitan areas 
was 696,154 persons in the 1990 sample  and 1,789,101 persons in 
2000.  As will be seen in the discussion of our findings, this limits 
some of our conclusions. 
 
intercepts for each of the 78 MSAs.  Because there are 
no site characteristics in the model except the median 
price of housing, the coefficient on the fixed effects 
reflects the MSA-specific intercept term.  The fixed 
effects vary as a result of the capitalization of site 
characteristics, as well as other unmeasured factors 
that lead to wage over- and under-compensation in 
the metropolitan area. 
 All variable definitions, data sources and descrip-
tive statistics are included in Table 1. The vector of 
human capital and effort related variables include edu-
cation and imputed experience (computed as age-
education-6) in linear and quadratic form, male, the 
dichotomous variables Asian, black, Hispanic, and other 
race.  Work effort is proxied by the annual hours of 
work, married, children, and unemployed.  A dummy 
variable is used to measure whether the worker speaks 
English well.  Housing costs are proxied by median 
value.  The occupational and industrial classifications are 
included to account for compensating differentials 
related to the job and the industry.  The occupational 
category also controls for human capital differences 
that are correlated with occupation.   
 
Stage 2: Obtaining over-compensation and under-
compensation measures 
 
 The purpose of this second stage is to explain the 
spatial variation in wages associated with the levels of 
site attributes.  The estimated first stage fixed effects 
coefficients for each MSA are regressed on a compre-
hensive vector of site attributes.  The residuals from 
stage two are interpreted as measures of incomplete 
compensation in wages.   
 The fiscal factors and natural amenities controls 
include measures of state and local taxation (income 
tax, total tax) and spending (education spending, highway 
spending, hospital spending, police spending, and welfare 
spending). The amenity list includes variables related 
to climate (precipitation, heating, cooling, temperature 
difference, sunshine, and wind speed), proximity to an 
ocean coast, violent crime, air quality (pmna), and aver-
age commute time to work for the metro area.  In addi-
tion, unmeasured amenities and disamenities related 
to urban scale are proxied by population density in 
linear and quadratic form (density squared), and total 
population.  We include the metropolitan area unem-
ployment rate to account for local business cycles that 
can affect household perceptions of the MSA.   
 We regress the estimated city-specific fixed effects 
from stage one on the site characteristic vector (Zj) as 
shown in equation (2), where the residuals are de-
noted with uj.   To avoid confusion, we define the esti-
mated  city-specific  fixed  effects  from  stage one as aj*  
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 Table 1. Variable Names, Definitions, Expected Signs, Data Sources 
 
 
Variable 
name 
 
Definition 
[mean, standard deviation in brackets] 
 
Expected 
Sign 
 
 
log(annual wage 
income) a 
 
Annual wage income earned in 1999:  [10.38, 0.67] 
 
dep. 
variable 
 
Human Capital Variables 
educationa Years of education: [13.36, 2.95] + 
experiencea,  
experience2 a 
Years of experience, defined as age-education-6:  [17.70, 10.77]     
experience*experience      
+ 
- 
malea Dichotomous variable = 1 if individual is male, 0 otherwise [0.57, 
0.50] 
+ 
marrieda Dichotomous variable = 1 if individual             is married, 0 
otherwise [0.52, 0.50] 
? 
childrena Number of children in the household, 0 otherwise: [0.46, 0.50] ? 
blacka Dichotomous variable=1 if individual is black, 0 otherwise  [0.14, 
0.35] 
? 
Asiana Dichotomous variable = 1 if individual is Asian or Pacific is-
lander, 0 otherwise: [0.06, 0.23] 
? 
Hispanica Dichotomous variable = 1 if individual is of Hispanic ethnicity, 0 
otherwise: [0.16, 0.37] 
? 
other racea Dichotomous variable = 1 if individual is not white, black, or 
Asian;  0 otherwise:  [0.09, 0.28] 
? 
annual hoursa Average total hours worked in 1989:  [2250.56, 434.82] + 
unemployeda Dichotomous variable = 1 if individual is currently (2000) un-
employed, 0 otherwise; [0.02, 0.13] 
- 
Englisha Dichotomous variable = 1 if individual speaks English well or 
very well, 0 otherwise: [0.95, 0.22] 
+ 
 
Fiscal Variables 
income taxb State income tax revenue/$1,000 taxable income:  [103.86, 10.57]    + 
total taxb Per capita total tax liability for the metro area of residence 
(weighted county average for multi-county metro areas):   
[1025.42, 362.15] 
+ 
education spend-
ingb 
Per capita education spending for the metro area of residence 
(weighted county avg. for multi-county metro areas): [43.67, 
8.10] 
- 
highway spend-
ingb 
Per capita highway spending for the metro area of residence 
(weighted county avg. for multi-county metro areas):  [4.14, 1.33] 
- 
hospital  spend-
ingb 
Per capita hospital spending for the metro area of residence 
(weighted county avg. for multi-county metro areas):  [7.24, 5.51]  
- 
police     spend-
ingb 
Per capita highway spending for the metro area of residence 
(weighted county avg. for multi-county metro areas):  [4.14, 1.33] 
- 
welfare   spend-
ingb 
Per capita public safety spending for the metro area of residence 
(weighted county avg. for multi-county metro areas): [5.66, 1.31] 
- 
highway spend-
ingb 
Per capita welfare spending for the metro  area of residence 
(weighted county avg. for multi-county metro areas):  [3.91, 4.27] 
 
- 
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 Table 1 (continued). Variable Names, Definitions, Expected Signs, Data Sources 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a – 2000 Public Use Microdata Sample drawn from IPUMS database; b – County and City Extra for 2002;  c – National Oce-
anic and Atmospheric Administration Climatology of the United States; d – FBI Uniform Crime Reports; e-  2000 Census of 
Population and Housing; f – EPA Criteria Pollutant; g – U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
 
 
and we denote the predicted values from the estima-
tion of equation (2) as âj.   
 
 aj*   = Zj γj + uj    (2) 
 
 In general, a positive error uj >0 implies aj* > âj; 
that is, equation (2) under-predicts the hedonic wage 
compensation.  If equation (2) under-predicts the he-
donic wage, this implies that the actual wage is higher 
than the predicted wage and there is over-
compensation.  Likewise, a negative error uj <0 implies 
aj* < âj, in which case the model over-predicts the fixed 
effects and there is under-compensation in wages 
given the site characteristics. 
 
Stage 3: The Migration Equation 
 
 Lastly, the PUMS data are used to determine 
whether wage under or over-compensation influences 
the probability of migrating to another city.   Migra-
tion is defined as a household’s change in metropoli-
tan area over the period 1995-2000.  Nonmovers are 
defined as those who have changed houses without 
changing metropolitan areas.  Following Clark et al. 
(2003), we select only those households who changed 
 
Variable 
name 
 
Definition 
[mean, standard deviation in brackets] 
 
Expected 
Sign 
 
 
Amenity Variables 
precipitationc Annual inches of precipitation[36.01, 14.23]     + 
heatingc  Number of heating degree days per year (1 heating degree day 
= heating the residence 1 degree to 65o F for 1 day:  [461.37, 
2130.71] 
+ 
coolingc Number of cooling degree days per year  (1 cooling degree day = 
cooling the residence 1 degree to 65o F for 1 day: [1509.90, 
1072.96]  
+ 
temperature dif-
ferencec 
Difference between average max. July temp. and average max. 
January temp.:[37.54, 10.60] 
+ 
sunshinec Percentage of available sunshine: [60.22, 9.47] - 
wind speedc Average annual wind speed: [8.93, 1.34]  + 
coast Dichotomous variable = 1 if the MSA of residence has an ocean 
coastline, 0 otherwise: [0.52, 0.50] 
- 
violent crimed Violent crime rate = number of violent crimes divided by total 
population – 2000: [0.02, 0.013] 
+ 
commute timee Average commuting time to work in minutes for the metro 
area.: [25.12, 3.42] 
+ 
densitye 
density squared 
Population density = divided by metropolitan land area:  
[666.76, 958.46] 
? 
? 
total populatione Total 2000 metropolitan  population: [1789101, 1851801] ? 
median valuee Median value of housing for the metro area of residence:  
[76443.46, 38416.10] 
? 
pmnaf Dichotomous variable = 1 if the metro area of residence was de-
clared a nonattainment region for concentrations of particulate 
matter of 10 microns or less in 1990, 0 otherwise: [0.12, 0.32] 
+ 
unemployment 
rateg 
 
MSA unemployment rate – 1999: [4.75, 3.06] + 
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residence over the period so as to focus on the location 
decisions of marginal households (i.e., those house-
holds that drive hedonic compensation).  Hence, 
among this relatively mobile subset of the general 
population, we investigate the importance of incom-
plete compensation at the origin and/or the destina-
tion in determining the optimal location.   
 The binary logit model is shown in the following 
equation: 
 
Prob(Migr)i = Xiβi + Zojβoj + Zdjβdj + goNoj*abs(uoj) + 
hoPojuoj + gdNdjabs(udj)+ hdPdjudj + ei       (3) 
 
The Xi vector of personal characteristics is defined 
above and ei represents the usual error term.  The site 
characteristics vector Zj is subscripted to denote the 
levels of these characteristics at the origin (o) and des-
tination (d).  The four remaining terms are comprised 
of the residuals (uj) drawn from equation (2) as well as 
indicator variables to differentiate positive (P) from 
negative (N) residuals for both the origin and destina-
tion.  Because we are utilizing micro-data, it is reason-
able to assume that public sector characteristics are 
exogenous to migration. This construction of the mi-
gration equation permits under- and over-
compensation to have different effects at the origin as 
compared to the destination.  We let Pj = 1 if a given    
uj > 0; Pj = 0 otherwise, and Nj = 1 if uj < 0; Nj = 0 oth-
erwise. For ease of interpretation, we then take the 
absolute value of the negative residuals multiplied by 
the No and Nd dummy variables. The coefficients go, 
gd, ho, and hd capture the influence on migration of 
hedonic over or under-compensation for origin and 
destination.  We assume that potential migrants re-
spond to utility differences that include incomplete 
compensation of site characteristics in wages.   
Whether a location has a positive or negative fixed 
effect is largely irrelevant to this analysis.  If, for ex-
ample, an individual is over-compensated at any loca-
tion, that individual is better off than if he/she re-
sided, ceteris paribus, at an alternative location.  We 
expect, a priori, that over-compensation at the origin 
deters migration (ho<0) , while over-compensation at 
the destination encourages it (hd>0).  The opposite 
should be true for under-compensation at the origin 
and destination respectively (i.e.,  go>0, gd<0). 
 The vector of Personal Characteristics includes 
the age and education of the householder, marital status 
(married), the presence of children in the household, 
race and ethnicity (Asian, black, Hispanic, and other race) 
and the employment status of the householder (unem-
ployed).  The origin and destination Locational Char-
acteristics that are used in the specification of the 
fixed effects equation (stage two) are also included in 
the migration model.   
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
 Results of the wage income regression from equa-
tion (1) are summarized in Table 2.  After controlling 
for workers’ occupational and industrial classifica-
tions, all of the coefficients for personal characteristics 
are signed as expected with p-values less than 0.001.  
The magnitudes of the coefficients are also reasonable.  
For example, males earn 20.7% more than females, and 
English fluency raises income by 10.8%.  Also, differ-
ent racial and ethnic groups earn between 5.8% and 
16.7% less than whites.  Additionally, virtually all of 
the estimated coefficients for the occupational and in-
dustrial dummy variables are significant at the 5% 
level.  Finally, an F-test is used to determine if the set 
of fixed effect MSA dummy variables significantly 
increases the explanatory power of the regression.  
The computed F-Statistic is 30.16, which suggest with 
virtual certainty that inclusion of the fixed effect vari-
ables improves the explanatory power, and that loca-
tion features contribute to spatial variation in wage 
income.4   
 The second stage results are shown in Table 3.  
White’s test of the residuals from this regression 
shows no evidence of heteroskedasticity.  Nine of the 
21 estimated coefficients are significant at the 5% level 
or better, while three others are significant at 10%.  
The significant coefficients are precipitation, cooling, 
tempdiff, sunshine, commute time, density, density squared, 
population, total tax, police spending, welfare spending, 
and unemployment rate.5 The positive coefficient for 
unemployment rate indicates that higher metropolitan 
area unemployment is perceived as a disamenity re-
quiring higher compensating wage income.  This re-
sult is consistent with many other estimates (see Topel, 
1986, for a summary of these studies).  The positive 
coefficients on police spending and welfare spending sug-
gest these site attributes are disamenities.  Perhaps 
these variables are capturing the impacts of omitted 
socioeconomic disamenities that necessitate higher per 
capita spending on police and welfare.   
 The adjusted R2 of 0.81 and F = 16.32 suggests 
with near certainty (p < 0.0001) that site-specific amen-
ity and fiscal characteristics explain much of the MSA- 
                                                 
4 The equation is estimated without an intercept in order to avoid 
losing any of the 78 different MSA fixed effect coefficient estimates.  
The fixed effect coefficients therefore capture both the intercept 
influence as well as the average city-specific effect.  However, they 
are not expressed relative to an omitted city as would be the case 
had the intercept been included. 
5 The sign of the coefficient on commute time appears anomalous. 
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 Table 2.  Wage-Opportunity Locusa 
 
 
Human Capital and Median Value: 
 
Occupational Dummy Variables – continued: 
Variable Coefficient t-score Variable Coefficient t-score 
education   0.069096 112.77 management 0.436586 13.38 
experience 0.028834 70.38 production 0.060330 1.84 
experience2 -0.000426 -47.48 protective services 0.142203 4.21 
male   0.207844 65.67 repair 0.179293 5.44 
children 0.078844 28.06 sales 0.240795  7.37 
black -0.166761 -39.79 science  0.194800  5.48 
asian -0.145828  -23.41 service  -0.036870  -1.08 
other race -0.057768  -9.10 social science 0.064792  1.88 
hispanic -0.127669  -23.51 Industrial Dummy Variables: 
english   0.108007  15.48 agriculture/forestry/fishery -0.095078 -3.25 
annual hours   0.000260 79.81 military industrial -0.200211 -7.42 
median value   0.000020  2.29 arts/entertainment    -0.196271 -21.77 
Occupational Dummy Variables: construction -0.014094 -1.50 
administration 0.093347 2.87 education/social  -0.100109  -12.87 
architect/engineer    0.343005    10.19 financial/insurance/real est. 0.040330 5.40 
business operations   0.333780 9.98 information/communication     0.067535  7.49 
computers/math 0.445348    13.39 Manufacturing 0.032751 4.62 
construction 0.145935   4.38 mining     0.152175  4.73 
education/librarian 0.137974   4.12 professional/scientific -0.017216  -2.36 
entertainment 0.231328    6.82 public administration 0.054925  5.96 
extractive 0.119316    1.58 Retail -0.165634  -22.96 
finance 0.343612    10.26 Transportation   0.022457  2.59 
food -0.033536    -1.00 Other -0.160095  -17.57 
health 0.312665     9.43    
legal 0.438559     12.65    
maintenance -0.065591 -1.97    
materials mover 0.015925 0.49 
 
   
 a. intercept suppressed, number of observations = 142,138, unreported MSA dummy variables = 78 
 
 
 
specific wage variation.  Therefore,  the residuals from 
this regression can be reasonably interpreted as a 
measure of wage compensation net of amenity and 
public sector influences.  Specifically, positive residu-
als represent MSA wage and salary income greater 
than that which the second stage regression predicts.  
Similarly, negative residuals measure MSA wage and 
salary income below what the regression predicts.   
We next use these residuals as measures of wage and 
salary over- and under-compensation to explain 
household migration between MSAs for a sample of 
99,955 households that changed residence during the 
1995-2000 period.  Specifically, we estimated equation 
(3) to predict the probability that a household mi-
grates, where migration is defined as a change of 
MSA.  The results are shown in Table 4.  The marginal 
impact of a regressor on the probability of migrating 
(i.e., changing MSA) is computed as β*p*(1-p), where 
β is a regressor’s estimated coefficient and p is the es-
timated probability of migrating computed at the 
mean values of all the regressors.6  For example, aging 
one year lowers the probability of migrating by 0.2% 
while being male raises it by 1.2%.   
 Computing the odds ratio for each regressor, 
shown in the last column of Table 4, is perhaps a more 
revealing way to interpret the logit findings.  This ra-
tio represents the change in the odds of migration re-
sulting from a one standard deviation increase in a 
regressor.  With a logit specification, the odds of mi-
gration are specified in equation (4). 
 
                                                 
6 β*p*(1-p) for a dummy variable is computed as the discrete change 
in p as the variable changes from 0 to 1. 
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  Table 3.  Fixed Effect Regression (dependent variable = aj*: location specific fixed effects)a 
 
Variable 
 
Coefficient 
 
 
Standard 
error 
 
t-ratio 
 
 
pr.>|t| 
 
 
intercept 7.013 1.460 4.80 <0.001 
precipitation 0.013 0.005 2.38 0.021 
heating 2.42x10-5 1.10x10-4 0.22 0.828 
cooling 3.88x10-4 1.14x10-4 3.40 0.001 
temperature difference 0.034 0.013 2.60 0.012 
sunshine -0.031 0.011 -2.71 0.009 
wind speed -0.020 0.047 -0.43 0.671 
violent crime 0.857 3.31 0.26 0.797 
coast 0.016 0.029 0.55 0.586 
commute time -0.065 0.027 -2.38 0.021 
pmna 0.037 0.158 0.24 0.814 
density -8.61x10-4 2.51x10-4 -3.42 0.001 
density squared 4.86x10-8 2.61x10-8 1.87 0.067 
total population 1.68x10-7 4.83x10-8 3.48 0.001 
income tax -0.001 0.006 -0.18 0.855 
total tax -3.43x10-4 2.04x10-4 -1.68 0.099 
education spending 0.008 0.010 0.81 0.422 
highway spending -0.029 0.045 -0.64 0.525 
hospital spending  0.013 0.011 1.21 0.231 
police spending  0.127 0.045 2.80 0.007 
welfare spending  0.036 0.019 1.89 0.065 
unemployment rate 
 
0.042 
 
0.016 
 
2.64 
 
0.011 
 
 a. number of observations:  78, RADJ 2:  0.807, F-statistic: 16.32 
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That is, the odds ratio for a regressor is simply the 
product of the exponential of its corresponding coeffi-
cient estimate times the standard deviation of the vari-
able. 
 The site-specific characteristics are measured at 
both the MSA of origin and destination.  Forty-one of 
the 46 estimated coefficients in this category are sig-
nificant at the 0.001 level.  With few exceptions (e.g., 
air quality, pmna), all of the significant estimated coeffi-
cients have the anticipated signs.  The odds ratios re-
ported in Table 4 can be used to illustrate the strength 
of the findings.  For example, a one standard deviation 
increase in an amenity such as per capita education 
spending at the destination MSA increases the odds of 
migrating by 19.2% while the same increase at the ori-
gin MSA lowers the odds of migrating by about 16.6%.  
For a disamenity such as travel time to work, a stan-
dard deviation increase in the average commuting 
time at the destination MSA lowers the odds of mi-
grating by approximately 27.8%, while the same in-
crease travel time at the origin MSA increases the odds 
of migrating by 110.6%.7 
The four estimated coefficients for the measures of 
incomplete compensation are of the correct sign and 
they are significant at less than the 0.001 level.  The 
                                                 
7 A one standard deviation increase in commute time raises the aver-
age commute 17%. 
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odds ratios suggest that a standard deviation increase 
in over-compensation at the destination MSA makes the 
odds of migration 72.1% higher, while the same in-
crease in over-compensation at the origin MSA lowers 
the odds of migration by 39.5%.  Similarly, a standard 
deviation increase in under-compensation at the desti-
nation MSA lowers the odds of migration by 45.5%, 
while the same increase in under-compensation at the 
origin MSA increases the odds of migrating by 85.3%.   
Another method of evaluating the impact of incom-
plete compensation on the propensity to migrate is to 
consider the migration response that would have been 
expected in the absence of incomplete compensation.  
Column 4 of Table 4 shows the marginal probabilities 
used for these calculations.  Recall that under-
compensation at the origin and over-compensation at 
the destination are the measures that increase the 
probability of migrating.  In the absence of under-
compensation at the origin, the probability of migrat-
ing would fall by 3.8%.  The probability of migrating 
would fall 4.7% without over-compensation at the des-
tination.  Overall, these results suggest that the prob-
ability of migrating would have been 8.5% lower 
without the combined average effects of under-
compensation at the origin and over-compensation at 
the destination. 
 
 Table 4.  Migration Equation (dependent variable: change MSA = 1, 0 otherwise) 
 
 
Variable 
 
Coefficient 
 
Z 
 
pr.>|Z| 
 
βp(1-p) 
 
odds ratio 
 
 
age -0.017 -18.39 <0.001 -0.002 0.837 
education 0.166 43.09 <0.001 0.019 1.622 
male  0.109 4.87 <0.001 0.012 1.052 
married 0.044 1.93 0.054 0.005 1.022 
children -0.366 -17.33 <0.001 -0.042 0.833 
black -0.143 -4.60 <0.001 -0.016 0.953 
Asian 0.170 4.36 <0.001 0.020 1.039 
Hispanic 0.007 0.17 0.863 0.0008 1.002 
other race -0.011 -0.22 0.827 -0.0013 0.997 
unemployed 0.029 0.39 0.693 0.003 1.004 
median valued 6.0-5 14.81 <0.001 7.33x10-6 25.07 
median valueo -7.0x10-5 -16.17 <0.001 -7.59x10-6 0.034 
income taxd -0.0095 -3.54 <0.001 -0.001 0.878 
income taxo 0.0054 2.01 0.044 6.1x10-4 1.076 
total taxd -0.0019 -13.07 <0.001 -2.1x10-4 0.418 
total taxo 0.0019 13.88 <0.001 2.2x10-4 2.506 
education spendingd 0.024 3.70 <0.001 0.0027 1.192 
education spendingo -0.025 -3.80 <0.001 -0.0028 0.834 
highway spendingd -0.033 -1.23 0.217 -0.0037 0.960 
highway spendingo -0.038 -1.39 0.164 -0.0044 0.954 
hospital spendingd 0.078 11.35 <0.001 0.0089 1.373 
hospital spendingo -0.076 -10.69 <0.001 -0.0087 0.738 
police spendingd 0.394 9.67 <0.001 0.045 1.681 
police spendingo -0.398 -10.17 <0.001 -0.045 0.587 
welfare spendingd 0.106 7.12 <0.001 0.012 1.701 
welfare spendingo -0.105 -7.28 <0.001 -0.012 0.589 
precipitationd 0.047 10.56 <0.001 0.0053 1.900 
precipitationo -0.051 -11.75 <0.001 -0.0057 0.503 
heatingd -1.0x10-5 -0.21 0.838 -1.24x10-6 0.977 
heatingo 8.0x10-5 1.41 0.158 8.97x10-6 1.181 
coolingd 0.0014 13.08 <0.001 1.61x10-4 3.988 
coolingo 
 
-0.0015 
 
-13.77 
 
<0.001 
 
-1.66x10-4 
 
0.247 
 
Incomplete Compensation and Migration                                                                                                                     149 
  
 
 Table 4 (continued).  Migration Equation (dependent variable: change MSA = 1, 0 otherwise)a 
 
 
Variable 
 
Coefficient 
 
Z 
 
pr.>|Z| 
 
βp(1-p) 
 
odds ratio 
 
 
temperature diff. 0.079 8.38 <0.001 0.009 2.690 
temperature diff. -0.108 -11.62 <0.001 -0.012 0.258 
sunshined -0.106 -10.80 <0.001 -0.012 0.372 
sunshineo 0.117 12.40 <0.001 0.013 2.925 
wind speedd  0.095 4.03 <0.001 0.011 1.135 
wind speedo -0.029 -1.25 0.212 -0.003 0.961 
violent crimed -11.461 -5.83 <0.001 -1.301b 0.888 
violent crimeo 9.366 4.79 <0.001 1.064b 1.101 
coastd 0.102 7.74 <0.001 0.012 1.331 
coasto -0.078 -5.85 <0.001 -0.009 0.802 
commute timed -0.067 -3.34 0.001 -0.008 0.722 
commute timeo 0.151 7.58 <0.001 0.017 2.106 
pmnad 1.668 18.40 <0.001 0.241 2.158 
pmnao -1.382 -15.12 <0.001 -0.133 0.526 
densityd -0.0045 -18.58 <0.001 -5.1x10-4 0.0001 
densityo 0.0042 17.83 <0.001 4.7x10-4 1.12x104 
density squaredd 3.14x10-7 16.89 <0.001 3.56x10-8 380.474 
density squaredo -2.88x10-7 -15.75 <0.001 -3.28x10-8 0.0036 
total populationd 3.13x10-7 7.60 <0.001 3.56x10-8 2.679 
total populationo -4.86x10-7 -12.07 <0.001 -5.51x10-8 0.212 
overcomp.d 4.163 14.73 <0.001 0.473 1.721 
overcomp.o -3.919 -14.22 <0.001 -0.445 0.605 
undercomp.d -3.296 -12.58 <0.001 -0.374 0.545 
undercomp.o 
 
3.346 
 
13.48 
 
<0.001 0.380 
 
1.853 
 
a. number of obs: 99,955;   CHMSA=1: 15,724;  CHMSA=0: 84,231; log likelihood: -38812 (0.497).  Descriptive statistics for per-
sonal variables [mean, std. dev.]:  age [37.73,10.18]; education [13.78,2.92]; male [0.68,0.47]; married [0.51,0.50]; children 
[0.50,0.50]; black [0.13,0.34]; asian [0.05,0.23]; hispanic [0.14,0.35]; other race [0.07,0.26]; unemployed [0.02,0.13]. 
b. The absolute values of marginal probabilities cannot be greater than 1.  Note that the 95% confidence intervals for these 
marginal probabilities contain -1 and 1 respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 Next, we examine temporal changes in the migra-
tion propensity with respect to our measures of in-
complete compensation.  Table 5 shows the odds ra-
tios for the two time periods.  Two results are appar-
ent from this comparison:  First, the overall ordinal 
pattern of the effects of incomplete compensation is 
the same for 2000 as for 1990.  Over-compensation at 
the destination and under-compensation at the origin 
are stronger than over-compensation at the origin and 
under-compensation at the destination.  That is, for 
mobile households, the pull of over-compensation at 
the destination and the push of under-compensation at 
the origin exceed the holding power of over-
compensation at the origin and the repulsion of under-
compensation at the destination.  Second, households 
appeared to be more responsive to incomplete com-
pensation during the 1990s than during the 1980s.  A 
standard deviation increase in over-compensation at 
the destination MSA made migration 40.9% more 
likely in 1990 but 72.1% more likely in 2000.  This find-
ing suggests that the pull of over-compensation has 
strengthened for these cities.  Similarly, a standard 
deviation increase in over-compensation at the origin 
MSA lowered the odds of migration by 21.6% in 1990 
but by 39.5% in 2000, which implies stronger holding 
power of the origin MSAs.  Similar comparisons show 
greater responsiveness in 2000 to under-compensation 
at both the origin and destination MSAs.  These results 
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provide preliminary evidence that, for a one standard 
deviation change in the incomplete compensation 
measures, the tendencies toward equilibrium found in 
1990 appear to have strengthened in 20008.   
 
 
Table 5.   Comparison of Odds Ratios for Incomplete 
Compensation Variables (1990 v. 2000) 
 
 
Incomplete Com-
pensation Variable 
 
Odds Ratios 
(1990) 
 
Odds Ratios 
(2000) 
 
 
overcompd 
 
1.409 
 
1.721 
overcompo 0.784 0.605 
undercompd 0.576 0.545 
undercompo 1.470 1.853 
 
 
 
 Finally,  in Table 6, we turn to a temporal and spa-
tial comparison of the incomplete compensation 
measures.  Recall that 78 metropolitan areas were used 
to derive the second stage residuals that are the meas-
ures of incomplete compensation.  For this sample of 
cities, there is a slight tendency of patterns from 1990 
to persist in 2000.  Specifically, 34.6% of those MSAs 
that over-compensated in wages in 1990 also over-
compensated in 2000, and 21.8% of those that under-
compensated in 1990 were also under-compensating in 
2000.  However, these results imply that the remaining 
43.6% showed signs in 2000 that were opposite those 
of 1990.  Across the four regions, there are two note-
worthy spatial differences in incomplete compensa-
tion.  In 2000, Northeastern MSAs comprised 19.2% of 
the sample, but made up only  2.8% of the under-
compensating MSAs.  And, Midwestern MSAs were 
17.9% of the sample in 1990, but were 28% of the sam-
ple that overcompensated in that year.   
 While measures of incomplete compensation from 
1990 and 2000 are centered on zero since they repre-
sent residuals from the Stage 2 regression9, the vari-
                                                 
8 However, these comparisons must be qualified given that the size 
distribution of metropolitan areas differs between the two periods.  
Because the average size of the metropolitan areas is substantially 
larger in 2000 relative to 1990, the higher responsiveness may indi-
cate that the pull of new locations and the holding power of existing 
locations are stronger in larger metropolitan areas.  
 
9 Note that the mean of 1990 sample will not be equal to zero.  The 
residuals are derived from a subset of 78 MSAs drawn from the 
larger set of 267 MSAs that were available in 1990, and hence in-
cluded in the second stage regression.  The mean value of the 78 
residuals from the 1990 regression was –0.0214. 
ance differs by more than a factor of 10.  That is, the 
standard deviation from 1990 sub-sample is 3.17, and 
is only 0.27 for the 2000 sample. Not surprisingly, a 
measure of equivalence of variance reveals that these 
are significantly different at the 99% degree of confi-
dence10. There are several possible explanations for 
these differences.  First, it is possible that the earlier 
residuals were higher since they were derived from a 
more complete sample of cities (i.e., 267 vs. 78).  In 
fact, the in-sample fit for the Stage 2 regression is 
stronger in 2000 (R2adj=0.81) when compared to 1990 
(R2adj=0.72).  When the second stage regression for the 
1990 sample was estimated on the 78 cities available 
from the 2000 PUMS sample, the R2adj increased to 
0.75.  In addition, it is possible that the better fit also 
reflects the increasing importance of site-specific 
amenities and fiscal characteristics on the locational 
choice, which has subsequently led to smaller residu-
als in the Stage 2 regression. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
 Our results from the 2000 PUMS yield further evi-
dence that measures of incomplete compensation for 
site characteristics are significant determinants of mi-
gration.  Each stage of the three stage empirical model 
generates results that are remarkably consistent with 
Clark et al. (2003), which used 1990 data from the 
PUMS.  However, there are a few differences.  In the 
second stage, the site characteristics explain slightly 
more variation in the wage in 2000 as compared with 
1990.  In the third stage, a comparison of the odds ra-
tios reveals a stronger migration response to incom-
plete compensation in the latter period, even as the 
mean level of incomplete compensation appears to 
have fallen. 
 These findings have important implications for 
our understanding of migration behavior.  First, we 
continue to find that measures which capture disequi-
librium in amenity markets, that is, our incomplete 
compensation variables,  are significant determinants 
of migration.  The results presented here add to the 
evidence that migrants are cognizant of the “utility 
deal” offered by cities that over- or under-compensate 
for their local amenity and fiscal mix.  Secondly, equi-
librium drivers such as amenities are important factors 
in the migration decision.  In fact, these factors appear 
to explain more of the differences in real wages over 
time.  With the advent of the Internet, information 
about any given community is readily available and at  
                                                 
10 The Bartlett test, which is a χ2 with one degree of freedom is 
274.08.  This tests the null hypothesis that the subgroup variances of 
each year are equal, and assumes normally distributed variables.    
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 Table 6.  Under-compensation and Over-compensation in 1990 and 2000 
 
  
Over-compensation 2000 
 
 
Under-compensation 2000 
 
Over-compensation 1990 
 
27 MSA’s (34.6%) 
NE: 6; MW: 6; South: 9; West: 6 
 
Akron, OH - Midwest 
Albuquerque, NM - West 
Atlanta, GA - South 
Baltimore, MD - South 
Buffalo, NY - Northeast 
Cleveland, OH - Northeast 
Dallas, TX - South 
Ft. Wayne, IN - Midwest 
Houston, TX - South 
Indianapolis, IN - Midwest 
Knoxville, TN - South 
Lakeland, FL - South 
Los Angeles, CA - West 
Louisville, KY - South 
Milwaukee, WI - Midwest 
Monmouth, NJ - Northeast 
Norfolk, VA - South 
Philadelphia, PA - Northeast 
Pittsburgh, PA - Northeast 
Riverside, CA - West 
San Diego, CA - West 
Spokane, WA - West 
Syracuse, NY - Northeast 
Tacoma, WA - West 
Tampa, FL - South 
Toledo, OH - Midwest 
Wichita, KS – Midwest 
 
 
16 MSA’s (20.5%) 
NE: 0; MW: 6; South: 7; West: 3 
 
Canton, OH - Midwest 
Charlotte, NC - South 
Chicago, IL - Midwest 
Cincinnati, OH - Midwest 
Columbus, OH - Midwest 
Detroit, MI - Midwest 
Greensboro, NC - South 
Kansas City, MO - South 
Nashville, TN - South 
New Orleans, LA - South 
Pensacola, FL - South 
Portland, OR - West 
St. Louis, MO - South 
Seattle, WA - West 
Tucson, AZ - West 
Youngstown, OH - Midwest 
 
Under-compensation 1990 
 
18 MSA’s (23.1%) 
NE: 7; MW: 0; South: 6; West: 5 
 
Allentown, PA - Northeast 
Bakersfield, CA - West 
Boise City, ID – West 
Columbia, SC - South 
Ft. Lauderdale, FL - South 
Harrisburg, PA - Northeast 
Hartford, CT - Northeast 
Lancaster, PA - Northeast 
Little Rock, AR - South 
Melbourne, FL - South 
Modesto, CA - West 
New York, NY - Northeast 
Orlando, FL - South 
Providence, RI - Northeast 
Salt Lake City, UT - West 
San Antonio, TX - South 
Springfield, MA - Northeast 
Stockton, CA – West 
 
 
17 MSA’s (21.8%) 
NE: 2; MW: 2; South: 8; West: 5 
 
Austin, TX - South 
Baton Rouge, LA - South 
Boston, MA - Northeast 
Charleston, SC - South 
Fresno, CA - West 
Grand Rapids, MI - Midwest 
Jackson, MS - South 
Las Vegas, NV - West 
McAllen, TX - South 
Minneapolis, MN - Midwest 
Phoenix, AZ - West 
San Francisco, CA - West 
San Jose, CA - West 
Sarasota, FL - South 
Scranton, PA - Northeast 
Washington, DC - South 
West Palm Beach, FL - South 
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relatively low cost.  Thus, as the baby-boom genera-
tion ages and accumulates wealth, the demand for site 
specific attributes is expected to increase.  The 
strengthening of this migration response suggests an 
ongoing improvement in the interregional efficiency of 
labor markets in the U.S.   
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